The New Zealand Food Bill is being passed amidst stern criticism of its content and the influence of multi-national corporations and the Codex Alimentarius Commission, whose food-safety standards motivated the bill. These concerns illustrate the large democratic and legitimisation deficits in global governance. One response to these criticisms and concerns is global administrative law, which focuses on promoting administrative law tools to enhance accountability. However, an examination of the Food Bill reinforces two main critiques of global administrative law: that it excludes addressing substance of international law and brackets democracy. I argue the limited GAL approach cannot be justified and the significant gaps in its approach require that it engage with democracy. I analyse the possibilities of global administrative law to engage with (to acknowledge and adopt) two theories of global democracy -deliberative and cosmopolitan -using the Food Bill as a case study.
Agreements. These agreements provide that states who accept Codex Commission standards are presumed to be complaint with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. So in effect, adoption of Codex Commission standards provides legal defence within the WTO system for claims based on food safety measures. Those who depart from the Codex Commission standards are heavily exposed.
Thus, the de-facto status of Codex Commission standards and the necessity for a small, export-orientated state like New Zealand to retain good 'membership' in the international trading system created an intense pressure on the New Zealand government to embed the Codex Commission standards within its domestic legal system. While New Zealand's food safety laws may have been ripe for reform, it is this intense pressure I argue that lead to the Codex Commission's standards being adopted.
B. The Reaction to the Food Bill
As I briefly discussed in the introduction, the response of the New Zealand public, interest groups, political figures, and other commentators was highly critical of the Food Bill and often uncharacteristically visceral. The New Zealand Food Action Group quickly established 5 HR (NZ) Deb 22 July 2010, vol 665, page 12615 <http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/debates/deba tes/49HansD_20100722_00000652/food-bill-%E2%80%94-first-reading> accessed 10 January 2014. 6 ibid. Food Bill 160-2 will seriously impede initiatives like community gardens, food co-ops, heritage seed banks, farmers markets, bake sales, and roadside fruit & vegetable stalls'. 9 They also argued that '[t] he primary intention behind Food Bill 160-2 is to enhance international trade rather than improve NZ food safety'. 10 They also set out in detail 27 issues with the Food Bill, including the erosion of national sovereignty, predominance of trade interests, and the commercial bias of Codex Commission due to lobbying.
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Others were also highly censuring, claiming that the Food Bill 'turns a human right (to grow food and share it) into a government-authorised privilege that can be revoked by the Governor-General' 12 and in one interesting comment, a critic states that 'Codex The connection of the Food Bill to the legitimacy problems of the Codex Commission did not escape attention; it was clear, another activist voiced, that 'agribusiness giants like Monsanto want full control of the food supply, which means putting an end to smallscale agriculture systems that operate "off the grid," so to speak'. 14 Other critics believed that the 'modernisation' rationale of the legislation masked its real purpose to provide market monopolies to multinational corporations.
There was also strong criticism of the diminished role of the New Zealand parliament -the centrepiece of national democracy -in this global regime. Comments in this vein showed deep unease: '[i]n New Zealand, the goals of Codex Commission are being implemented at a rate that can only make the technocrats of the US and EU envious' 15 as one commentator put it.
Thus, criticism came from a range of actors, covering both the content of the Food Bill, the national democratic processes, and the legitimacy of the Codex Commission. I
argue that the concerns of New Zealanders regarding the Food Bill are important because it provides an archetypal example of the democratic and legitimacy deficits in global governance, such that even one of the most isolated nations in the world bears the impact. Furthermore, as food production, supply, and distribution is increasingly globalised and subject to globalised regimes such as the Codex Commission the issues raised by New Zealanders will become increasingly pertinent.
While the expression of criticisms covered a range of political and legal concerns, I
suggest the essential problem of the Food Bill and the Codex Commission is the real and perceived inability of the New Zealand to pursue its own policy course and the lack of accountability and legitimacy of the Codex Commission's standard-making activities in relation to the New Zealand public.
These problems in accountability, legitimacy, and democracy in global bodies and the independence of national policy courses are not new and GAL has, amongst others, analysed the issues and proposed reform. However, as I argue, the problems and limitations of GAL as a response to these issues are exposed when we analyse the Food Bill and
Codex Commission in further detail.
The problem therefore are both the Food Bill, as an example of the significant democratic and accountability deficits in global governance, and the anaemic response of GAL to these practical and institutional dilemmas. With this in mind, I now turn to provide a background to GAL and then examine and criticise GAL's actual and potential response to the Food Bill and the Codex Commission.
C. The GAL Approach
The seminal article of GAL is 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law' by Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B Stewart.
16 They defined GAL as:
'the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make.'
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In this article, Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart note that much of global governance can be understood and analysed as administrative action that would be familiar to domestic public lawyers. 18 This (global) administrative action is delineated from the familiar domestic administration system by the space it operates in and the actors who populate that space. Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart characterise this 'global administrative space'
as a multi-layered and extra-ordinarily varied landscape
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They argue the global administrative space transcends the traditional dichotomy of the domestic regulatory space (governed by domestic public and administrative law) and inter-state relations (as governed by international law), 20 containing elements of both these regime while remaining a relatively autonomous space.
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Within the global administrative space, according to Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart there is five types of regulatory actors:
• Formal international organisations;
• Transnational networks of cooperative regulatory officials;
• Distributed administration by national regulators;
• Hybrid inter government-private arrangements;
• Private institutions with regulatory functions. However, as I argue, a GAL approach has major gaps in its theoretical and normative analysis, giving little or no consideration and analysis to certain features of the Codex Commission's standard-setting activities such as the likelihood that most New Zealander actors affected by its standards have likely never heard of the Codex Commission, the impact of burdens on small-producers, whether it achieves the appropriate balance between health protection and trade practices, the power given to government agents, and the distribution of benefits and costs.
In short, many New Zealanders were highly censuring of the content of the food standards. There were also implicitly concerned over the perceived inability for affected New Zealand actors to pursue their own policy choices and anxious over the technocratic nature and impact of the Codex Commission.
GAL thus either omits misses many of the concerns of New Zealanders and offers a response that simply fails to address several key concerns. We see Bevilacqua pays little attention to the impact of the Codex Commission's law-making activities on individuals, concerned more with the de facto legal force, relevance, myriad of interests, and political implications of its decision as rationale for increasing transparency and accountability.
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Thus while the GAL formula coheres around input legitimacy or ensuring the legal 'fairness' of decision-making procedures it fails to address deeper concerns. Livingston's suggestion to enhance the decision-making quality of the Codex Commission's activities by providing for review seeks to promote natural justice and procedural fairness as key tenets of accountability. These tools simply do not explore or sufficiently address the greater anxieties of New Zealanders regarding the Food Bill and the Codex Commission.
These anxieties reveal a general unease amongst New Zealanders over control of food policy and wariness of distant actors controlling the private activities of individuals.
In short, they also go to the quality, nature, and values of democracy in the norm-making process of the Codex Commission and the New Zealand Food Bill. Several scholars have picked up on these missing elements of the GAL approach and analysed the consequence in further detail. I now turn to explore in further detail the two main academic critique of GAL that reflect and more clearly articulate the concerns of New Zealander.
These critiques then allow us to explore the deficiencies of the GAL approach in more detail, frame the concerns of New Zealanders regarding the Food Bill in a coherent fashion, and locate them within the broader debate over global governance.
III. Criticisms of GAL A. Exclusion of Substantive Law
The first major critique, echoing the disquiet of many New Zealand detractors regarding the content of the Food Bill, is that GAL improperly excludes the substantive content of international law from its purview and thus establishes an untenable distinction between substantive and administrative law. Chimni, third-world approach to international law theorist, has attacked the theoretical construction and evolution of GAL that raises this distinction between the substantive and administrative. His central thesis is that distinction between substantive and administrative law means that GAL is a limited tool 42 ibid 43.
of resistance and change, tends towards co-option by powerful states, and has an enervated role in injecting democracy and legitimacy into international law and its institutions. 43 Chimni argues that global governance has been transformed into a 'global state', whose character and law must influence the nature of GAL as global law. As such, GAL shapes itself around how it interprets the development and nature of the global state and its institutions. Thus, GAL may adopt a narrow or broad definition depending on the political theory used to give meaning to these developments. 44 The narrow definitionadopted by Kingsbury et al -rests on a dualistic understanding of international law in that excludes directly address individuals. The broad definition of GAL transcends this dualism and taking into account the distinctive features of the modern global state it ultimately rejects the division of international law into substantive and administrative law.
Chimni also argues that given that international law is an imperial endeavour dominated by a privileged class, the procedural approach of GAL cannot hope to generate real change or legitimacy because it excludes the review of the substantive content of those laws or norms. Even if the power asymmetries immanent in international law and global governance are bracketed, Chimni maintains that the separation of substantive law and administrative law is unsustainable because globalisation has fundamentally altered the nature of international law and its institutions such that states are transformed into administrative agencies of global governance, whose rule-making directly impacts individuals. 45 In such an order, the state is incapable of mediating as a democratic forum to any creditable level.
Although Chimni's critiques emanated from a third world perspective, they have considerable relevance to the New Zealand Food Bill. A major concern in the Food Bill debate was that the New Zealand House of Representatives functioned as a shallow site for contestation over food-safety standards and did not fulfil its democratic role as a mechanism of national self-determination. Also recall the anxiety over Monsanto and multinational corporations' ability to manipulate food-safety standards for their own benefits as well as over the eagerness of the New Zealand government to adopt the Codex Commission's standards.
Further, the dualism of international law that GAL theorise no longer represents an adequate response to democratic and legitimacy concerns as the power of the New Zealand state to pursue its own policy choices as well as the ability of its primary democratic forum, the House of Representatives, is severely constrained by pressure to conform with the Codex Commission standards. I also suggest that Chimni's arguments reveals that input legitimacy -in the form of increased participation -cannot remedy concerns over the substance of norms at hand. As such, the multifarious concerns of New 
B. Bracketing of Democracy
This second major critique of GAL, echoing the concerns of New Zealanders that they were no longer determining their own policy choices, is that it inappropriately 'brackets' the question of democracy. From its inception, GAL perceived numerous democratic deficits in global governance and offered its toolkit of understandings and solutions. However, its exponents explicitly excluded questions of democracy from this framework. Instead, they commented that 'the better interim course might be to bracket questions of democracy' and 'to focus on attaining more limited […] objectives'.
46 Similarly, Bevilacqua in his analysis posits that 'it is impossible to reproduce a parliamentary system on a global scale or a world constitution' 47 and thus tacitly acknowledged the limited ambition of the GAL approach. While the exclusion of democracy may have been a genuine choice by GAL scholars, I argue that this choice lies at the heart of GAL's inability to meet the concerns of New Zealanders.
In this regard, Susan Marks has made several pithy and poignant arguments against this democratic exculpation and explored its consequences. Fundamentally, she argues that 'democracy belongs wherever public agendas are set and policies are framed' 48 and develops her critiques of GAL from that precept.
Firstly, she highlights the danger of treating as technical that which needs to be treated as political. 49 She defines the 'political' catholically, meaning questions about 'public priorities and social projects' and choices over allocation of goods and opportunities. The approach of GAL, she contends, aims to strengthen and clarify norms, with little understanding of how this structuring will benefit some and deprive others. 50 The risk in the GAL approach is that examination and reform of decision-making processes can occur in a technocratic bubble, with minimal awareness of the political significance of those processes.
This technocratic attitude is apparent in the GAL approach to the Codex Commission that seeks to clarify norms and rules via appeal (the Livingstone route) of decisions made that would have impact on New Zealanders. This appeal procedure would not take into account the impact of the challenged standards insofar as these are not reflected in the rules; ignoring the several concerns of New Zealanders such as the perceived burden of impact on small food-producers.
Marks's other major critique regards the conceptual apparatus underpinning GAL's exclusion of democracy and its embrace of accountability. She explains that GAL's theoretical evolution engenders a change from a participatory to a delegation model of accountability. She challenges the attachment to a delegation model in which GAL ensures businesses' receive reasons for a decision and an opportunity for appeal, but little is done to connect ordinary people to the entities making decisions about their lives. 51 I also sug- to bear 'wherever public agendas are set and policies are framed'.
On a broader level, the GAL response also risks, as both Harlow and Marks warn, an ossification of politics. While participation, transparency, and judicial review are all important tools to enhance the democratic credentials of the Codex Commission and address the concerns of New Zealanders, we should remind ourselves that reliance on rules and processes cannot substitute for critically thinking about the ultimate goals of the international legal order.
56
In sum, I have shown how the GAL approach is a useful theoretical framework for understanding and analysing problems in global governance ultimately faces severe limitations. I argue that the two key critiques and further examination of the Food Bill casestudy shows that for GAL to overcome its weaknesses a diametrical course must be followed: it must engage with democracy to retain value as a reformatory project. I explore this in the next two parts. The process of GAL 'engaging' with these theories of democracy is not fully defined because the exact nature and possibility for engagement is only clear when a particular theory of global democracy is analysed. But at a broad level I define 'engaging' as acknowledging the need and relevance of the democratic theory, adopting it as its normative superior, and integrating the key components of its framework.
In this analysis my approach is to briefly explore each democratic theory, distil its key concepts and institutions as applied to the Codex Commission and Food Bill, then analyse how GAL is consistent with such a formulation. This allows me to comment on the possible opportunities for GAL to engage with each theory of democracy.
Underpinning my analysis is the belief where GAL can engage with theories of democracy, a middle ground between the limitations of a narrow GAL approach and the utopian hopes of global constitutionalism, or a way beyond some of the intractable problems of both, may be found. Such a reformulated GAL may provide greater possibilities for New Zealanders (and others subject to global governance regimes) to connect more directly with the Codex Commission, powerful tools for challenging and addressing the deficits revealed by the New Zealand Food Bill, and a framework for future reform of global governance. My analysis suggests both deliberative democracy and cosmopolitan democracy offer opportunity for GAL to engage with democracy; however, substantial modification by GAL would be required.
A. What is Deliberative Democracy?
The theory of deliberative democracy I use here is primarily that of Jürgen Habermas as adapted to the global level by Steven Wheatley. Deliberate democracy is a political theory that emphasises the importance of procedure in making politics democratic. It proposes that political truths, the exercise of authority, and the legitimacy of law are all discovered by and grounded in the processes of discourse and deliberation. Accordingly, democracy and discourse are two sides of the same coin; 57 they reinforce each other and form an ineluctable link.
While deliberative democracy is a broad political theory, it has a particular interest in the operation and legitimacy of law. Under deliberative democracy, the legitimacy of law is an exercise of authority. As law is the ultimate outcome of democracy and discourse, its legitimacy is grounded on the discursive (democratic) nature of its creation. For this law to be legitimate and thereby discursively grounded, it creation requires a communication act that 'as participants in rational discourses, consociates under law must be able 
Usefully, Wheatley distils his model down to four requirements:
• There must be regulatory directives framed in terms of international law;
• The global 'regulatory' actor must exercise legitimate authority;
• Legitimate authority requires the adoption of regulations in accordance with right reasons;
• The right reasons are determined through deliberative democratic processes that include the interests and perspectives of those subject to the regime.
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Global Deliberative Democracy and the Codex Commission
With this brief exploration of global deliberative democracy in place, I now explore and analyse its concrete application of its approach to the Food Bill, which allows us to consider in more detail how global deliberative democracy addresses the concerns of New Zealanders in greater depth. In short, substantial institutional, legal, and cultural changes would be required in order for the Codex Commission to have legitimate authority under global deliberative democracy. Ultimately, I argue that if GAL were to engage with global deliberative democracy it would be able provide a far more nuanced, complex, and ultimately stronger response that would overcome some of its severe limitations in addressing the concerns of New Zealanders regarding the Food Bill. However, an analysis of some of the key similarities and differences between global deliberative democracy and GAL reveals that there is significant incompatibility between the two theories at present. I have sought in this discussion to explore the global deliberative democracy model as applied to the Food Bill and show how it apprehends and addresses the concerns of New Zealanders better than the GAL model. While GAL shares some consistency with global deliberative democracy, there remain significant barriers to its full engagement with global deliberative democracy. Such amendments would have to include GAL adopting the 'subjected-to' standard as the criterion for participation in decision-making and Wheatley's delineation of the demos by reference to the exercise of authority. More generally, GAL would have to absorb the values of deliberative democracy such as equality and public reason to a greater degree. GAL would also have to reorient itself to view deliberation and participation as the primarily a tool not only for accountability but (discursive) democracy.
More difficult adjustments would have to be made in endorsing the creation of representative and electoral assemblies and the role of human rights standards, as well as shedding its reluctance to endorse grander normative projects that offer a fully-elaborated vision and justification of global governance. These changes may be anathema to the pragmatic, incremental approach favoured by GAL scholars; however, the case study of the Food Bill has shown that its response is manifestly inadequate to the concerns espoused by a range of New Zealanders and it must amend or face irrelevance.
B. Cosmopolitan Democracy
In this part I explore the possibility for GAL to engage with cosmopolitan democracy by using the Food Bill case study. I conclude that similar to global deliberative democracy, there exists potential for GAL to engage with cosmopolitan, however, considerable modification may be needed.
What is Cosmopolitan Democracy?
The theory of cosmopolitan democracy I analyse is primarily that of David Held and Daniele Archibugi, with emphasis on Archibugi's full theorisation in The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Archibugi defines cosmopolitan democracy is as 'a project of normative political theory that attempts to apply some of the principles, values, and procedures of democracy to the global political system'. 90 Its antecedents are traced to early theoretical responses to globalisation.
In 1995 Archibugi and Held published Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a
New World Order, the first book-length elaboration of their theory. In it they argued that the nature and prospects of democracy had been radically altered by globalisation. The locus of political power no longer resided in national governments and 'political communities of fate' were no longer delimited by territorial boundaries. ocratic theory faced several dilemmas.
92 Standard democratic questions, such as what is the relevant constituency, whose consent and participation is needed in decisions, and to whom should decision-makers be accountable no longer anticipated conclusive answers.
For cosmopolitan democrats, the solution to this impasse lay not in promoting a different system of governance; democracy remained the sole source of authority and power. Instead, the solution required a re-imagining of democracy to address the 'crisis of legitimacy' 93 caused by the loss of state autonomy and the increasing complex interdependency of the world. Archibugi thus rearticulated democracy as a process rather than a set of norms and procedures 94 (although his vision does emphasise several liberal values and principles including equality, dignity, accountability, consent, and participation). 95 As he phrases it, the process of democracy was neither static nor unfinished, but rather an endless project or path.
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The institutional architecture of cosmopolitan democracy contains several (often radical) proposals. Foremost, cosmopolitan democracy is not only a blueprint for global governance but a complete democratic schema for five paradigmatic levels of governance: local, state, inter-state, regional, and global. 97 The framework for the interrelationships is characterised as a midpoint between an association of existing states (a confederation such as NATO) and a federation (such as Germany or Australia). Thus, cosmopolitan democracy shies away from an overly centralised global order, suggesting instead a mixture of integration and reform of the existing sub-and supra-state structure with several new institutions.
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Amongst these reforms, change at the UN is a key tenet. Archibugi proposes a range of substantive and procedural reforms, including making the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice compulsory and providing non-state actors with enhanced standing. Another main proposal of cosmopolitan democracy is the establishment of regional parliaments and a world parliament with members directly elected by world citizens.
Given the proliferation of political actors and demarcation of governance, the rules governing the hierarchical relationship between the different levels of governance and the spatial rules regulating international institutions is critical to cosmopolitan democracy. However, cosmopolitan democracy emphatically rejects the existing approach to the distribution of political power based on sovereignty. 99 Archibugi considers constitutionalism offers a better model to allocate competencies and resolve conflicts, suggesting a global constitution that would mandate judicial adjudication on the distribution of power.
Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Codex Commission
Cosmopolitan democrats have tended to pursue a broad approach in applying their theory to the new regulatory regimes in global governance. There has been no applica- New Zealanders as world citizens with a stake in global governance entities like the Codex Commission.
I submit that the cosmopolitan democratic approach also offers a nuanced and powerful response to the concerns of New Zealanders that related not only to the Codex Commission but broader democratic and constitutional questions regarding their ability to determine their own policies. I argue that despite a divergence of aims, GAL may already be compatible with certain features of the cosmopolitan democratic vision and that opportunities exist for GAL to engage with cosmopolitan democracy more squarely and offer a greater value response to problems in global governance.
Compatibility Between GAL and Cosmopolitan Democracy
My first point is that there may already be substantial compatibility between GAL and cosmopolitan democracy because the latter integrates GAL projects in its vision.
Paradigmatically, cosmopolitan democracy also encourages a small-step approach to reform. Archibugi and Held acknowledge the grand ambition of cosmopolitan democracy but state that 'cosmopolitan democracy was never intended to provide a closed recipe, but as a unifying framework for a battery of proposals and campaigns that, in different ways, aim to develop global governance in a democratic direction'. There is also substantial compatibility between GAL and cosmopolitan democracy regarding the emphasis of increasing accountability in global governance. Held has underscored the important problem of accountability deficits in global governance that necessitates a response. 105 This same lacuna -the lack of accountability -is the raison d'être of GAL. In his earlier theorising, Held also posited short-term goals of reform based on participation, representativeness, and accountability. Thus, it could be argued that GAL is part of the seeds of an emergent cosmopolitan democratic framework as it already internalises and expresses elements of a nascent (global) democracy.
There is also an important element of compatibility between GAL and cosmopolitan democracy in their shared framework for interpreting globalisation, global governance, The Codex Commission and the Food Bill is thus a regime that both cosmopolitan democracy and GAL would identify as a supranational site of authority exhibiting a lack of accountability and democracy. Their congruity of interpretation would provide GAL with an existing toolkit of analysis, concepts, and vocabulary to understand the democratic problems inherent in the Codex Commission but also the ability to provide a more powerful and contextual understanding of the regime in global governance that GAL in its present form lacks.
However, there are several features to cosmopolitan democratic approach that GAL either misses or purposely excludes that is incompatible with cosmopolitan democracy.
Firstly, GAL rejects the likelihood of more ambitious aims such as a world parliament and global constitution. In Archibugi's words, cosmopolitan democracy aims 'to achieve a world order based on the rule of law and democracy'. The last major incompatibility I highlight concerns democracy and legitimisation.
Cosmopolitan democracy holds democracy (in particular electoral democracy) as the sole mode of legitimisation for political power and (global) governance. Recall that cosmopolitan democrats theorised a 'crisis of legitimisation' in response to globalisation that was not due to a paucity of concepts or ideas to legitimise governance, but stemmed from the inability of existing political theory to apply democracy to the new fluidity and mutability of political structures. In its view, democracy remains the apogee of political values; it provides the ultimate source of legitimating politics and governance.
At variance with this, GAL challenges the privileging of (particularly electoral) democ- For GAL to privilege other modes of legitimisation and exclude democratic (particularly electoral) modes then it neglects a central concern of New Zealanders, who I argue, ultimately want to take control of their own policy course by familiar electoral or other direct democratic control over the Codex Commission as the superior norm generator. In this respect, alternative legitimisation methods proposed by GAL proponents such as review and enhanced participation will fail to address the legitimacy concerns of New Zealanders. require GAL scholars to explicitly acknowledge the normative superiority of the cosmopolitan democratic project and locate their project in enhancing the accountability of the Codex Commission within the broader umbrella. As with deliberative democracy, these changes may be at odds with the cumulative GAL approach, however, a broader response and engagement with democracy is required to meet the concerns of New Zealanders.
V. Conclusion
The New Zealand Food Bill illustrates the large democratic and legitimisation lacuna that pervades global governance. New Zealanders, jealous of their food-producing prerogative and with a strong and critical tradition of democracy, reacted strongly to the perceived encroachment on these rights and freedoms by the Codex Commission. These concerns cannot simply be dismissed as 'anti-globalisation' hyperbole by isolationists; the detractors were large and varied and New Zealand as a whole has a proud history of international cooperation.
What the Food Bill shows is that issues of democracy and legitimacy in global governance are of considerable and practical importance as global governance regimes, like the Codex Commission, multiply and their scope of power and influence increases. Even small, distant countries now find themselves under legal and political pressure to adopt certain norms and their nationals are subject to legal determination by global governance bodies.
GAL represents a positive step forward by providing conceptual and normative framework to understand the new global governance structure. It has helped to expose areas of governance previously overlooked, offered practical tools to militate against some of the worst excesses of global governance, and helped to enhance the accountability of new global actors wielding public power. However, seven years after GAL was introduced into the legal lexicon an examination of the Food Bill exposes the fundamental limitations of its approach. The substantive merit of global norms and laws are excluded as is the entire question of democracy. This is not simply a negligible or acceptable side-effect of framing; major issues over the fairness, impact, burden, motivation, creation, and context of the Food Bill are missed.
Instead, I have shown that GAL must engage with democratic theorising if it is still to retain relevance and a realistic ability to address the major democratic and legitimacy deficits of international law and global governance in the 21st century. I have explored the possibility of GAL to acknowledge and adopt two theories of global democracy -deliberative and democratic. However, while deliberative democracy or cosmopolitan democracy may offer opportunities for GAL to engage with democracy, these may not be the best or most democratic theories. When addressing the democratic question GAL scholars face the archetypal question: what type of democracy is the 'best' and which should we adopt?
It is likely that GAL scholars will be reluctant to engage in such broader theorising.
They will be concerned over the need to do so, the complexity in doing so, and wary of the potential distension of GAL as a result. However, the need is pressing, the conceptual resources are available, and the results are achievable. I also point out that my approach to democratic engagement is a brief exploration in this area; it does not seek to formulate a definitive technique. Perhaps on final analysis GAL cannot integrate or promote any democratic theory without losing its coherence and effectiveness. In such a case it should be ejected; the issues at stake are too important to let doctrine lead us nor will they dissipate -in New Zealand a new Natural Health Products Bill has been introduced that one critic has compared to the 'other leg' of the Codex Commission's agenda in New Zealand that will 'will kick New Zealanders in the guts'.
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In this pursuit, what may be helpful to legal scholars of global governance -whether GAL or otherwise -is to always keep in mind one critical question: what does this theory do to connect, in a real, democratic, and effective way, the coffee grower in Kenya to the fair-trade certification of its coffee, the tourist operator in Brazil seeking a loan from a state bank to the Basel Committee, a refugee in Syria to the UNHCR, and an apricot grower in New Zealand to the Codex Commission.
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